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Abstract
The paper provides a presentation and motivation of the concept
of non-empirical theory confirmation. Non-empirical theory confir-
mation is argued to play an important role in the scientific process
that has not been adequately acknowledged so far. Its formalization
within a Bayesian framework demonstrates that non-empirical con-
firmation does have the essential structural characteristics of theory
confirmation.
1 Introduction
The canonical view of the scientific process understands theory confirmation
in terms of a direct confrontation of a theory’s predictions with empirical
data. A scientific theory is expected to make testable empirical predictions.
If the relevant collected data agrees with those predictions, the data con-
firms the theory. If the data disagrees with the predictions, the theory gets
disconfirmed.
One may view this understanding in terms of a technical definition of
theory confirmation, which would render it immune against criticism. It
may be argued, however, that the concept of confirmation should account
for the scientists’ actual reasons for taking a theory to be well-established
as a viable description of a given aspect of the observed world. Endorsing
that aim, one may question a given understanding of theory confirmation by
comparing it with the scientists’ actual attitude towards their theories.
The latter view is the point of departure chosen in the present article.
It is assumed that the concepts deployed by the philosophy of science for
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modelling scientific reasoning should offer a characterization of the actual
structure of scientific reasoning - and should be measured by that standard.
On that account, however, a closer look at actual science throws the adequacy
of the canonical understanding of theory confirmation into doubt. In many
scientific fields, confirmation in the canonical sense described above is not the
only basis for an assessment of a theory’s status. Three interrelated issues
arise, which render an exclusive focus on empirical confirmation insufficient.
They shall be briefly sketched in the following.
1: In historical fields of research, scientists often face a conjunction of
two problems. First, the general character of scientific hypotheses in those
fields often makes it difficult to extract specific and quantitative predictions
from them. Second, and maybe even more troubling, those scientific fields
fields often deal with empirical situations where most of the empirical record
has been irretrievably lost to natural decay or destruction during the peri-
ods that lie between that events under investigation and the time of inquiry.
Moreover, even of the data that would be available in principle, it is often
only possible to collect a haphazard and arbitrary subset.1 Anthropologists
searching for early human traces, to give one example, cannot search specif-
ically for the missing link they are most interested in but must be content
with whatever new material their excavations provide. The two described
conditions in conjunction create a situation where empirical confirmation
remains patchy and, on its own, does not provide a stable foundation for as-
sessing the probability that a theory is trustworthy. External characteristics
of the theory and the research field therefore play an important role in that
assessment.
More specifically, if various conflicting hypotheses aim at explaining the
same available data, abductive forms of reasoning are deployed, which depend
on understanding whether or not one of the theories seems substantially more
plausible than the others. One important issue that must be addressed in
such cases is the question whether and if so on what grounds it makes sense
to assume that those theories that have been developed cover the spectrum of
possible plausible theories on the issue. Only if that is the case does it make
sense to trust the most plausible of the known theories. Trust in a theory thus
is instilled based on a combination of assessments of the spectrum of known
alternatives and some induced understanding of the presumptive spectrum
of unconceived alternatives.
2: A similar issue arises in the case of micro-physical theories that conjec-
ture the existence of unobservable physical objects like atoms, quarks or, to
mention an important recent example, the Higgs particle. In those cases, an-
1For an instructive philosophical perspective on historical sciences, see (Turner 2007).
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nouncing a discovery amounts to endorsing all empirical implications of the
discovered object, whether or not they have been empirically tested yet. A
discovery therefore has profound consequences in high energy physics. Once
a particle has been discovered in one experiment, background calculations
in all future experiments factor in all empirical implications the particle has
within the established theoretical framework. The question is, however, on
what basis scientists can be so confident that no unconceived alternative
could account for the data collected without having the same further empir-
ical implications as the known theory. The answer is that scientists cannot
make that assessment without relying on observations about the overall re-
search process. They need to make an assessment as to whether or not an
alternative seems likely to show up based on their understanding of the over-
all conceptual context and whether assessments of that kind have turned
out reliable in the past. In other words, the declaration of a discovery of
a new object in microphysics relies on considerations very similar to those
which lead scientists towards endorsing a theory in palaeontology or other
non-formalized historical sciences.
3: Finally, since the 1980s high energy physicists and cosmologists have
shown an increasing readiness to invest a high degree of trust in empirically
unconfirmed theories. Theories like string theory or cosmic inflation are taken
by many as important steps towards a deeper understanding of nature even
though those theories so far have no (in the case of string theory) or only
inconclusive (in the case of inflation) empirical confirmation. Once again it
turns out that the reasons responsible for that trust are of a very similar kind
as those at play in the previously discussed contexts.
Unlike in the previously discussed cases, the extent to which exponents of
empirically unconfirmed theories in fundamental physics consider their the-
ory well-established has led to a highly controversial debate on the scientific
legitimacy of the involved strategies of theory assessment. In this light, the
case of scientific trust in empirically unconfirmed theories turns the ques-
tion of an adequate understanding of the concept of confirmation from a
mainly philosophical issue into a question of high significance for the further
evolution of fundamental physics.
All three discussed scientific contexts suggest that a perspective that fo-
cusses entirely on the agreement between a theory’s predictions and empirical
data is insufficient for acquiring an adequate understanding of the reasons
why scientists trust a scientific theory.
In the following, I will present a widened concept of theory confirmation
that, as I will argue, comes closer to that goal.
Two basic guidelines will determine the layout of the presented approach.
On the one hand, as already pointed out above, the discussion will be guided
3
by the idea that the concept of confirmation should provide a basis for un-
derstanding the degree of trust scientists have in a theory. On the other
hand, however, the empirical character of science, that is the connection be-
tween confirmation and observation, shall not be abandoned. So, while the
approach to be presented is non-canonical, it will be argued to remain true
to core principles of scientificality.
2 The Setup
2.1 What is Non-empirical Confirmation?
The canonical view as it is presented in accounts from classical hypothetico-
deductivism to most readings of Bayesian confirmation (see e.g. Bovens and
Hartmann 2003, Howson and Urbach 2006) constrains confirmation to obser-
vations within the theory’s intended domain. Only the agreement between a
theory’s predictions and empirical data constitutes confirmation of that the-
ory. We will call this form of confirmation ”empirical confirmation” because
it is based on empirical testing of the theory’s predictions. Our question will
be: which kinds of consideration beyond the limits of empirical confirma-
tion may in principle be understood as contributions to theory confirmation?
More specifically, we’ll search for a form of ”non-empirical” theory confirma-
tion that can account for those considerations that have been argued above
to be crucial in a number of contexts for instilling trust in a scientific theory.2
At the same time, however, we want to retain the crucial role of observation
and stay as close as possible to the mechanism of empirical confirmation.
Confirmation should remain true to the basic principles of scientific reason-
ing.
In order to guarantee a grounding of confirmation in observation, we in-
troduce elements of empiricist reasoning at two distinct levels. First, we
understand trust in a theory in terms of the theory’s empirical predictions
rather than in terms of truth. If a scientist trusts a theory, she believes
that the theory’s predictions in its characteristic regime, if tested, will get
empirically confirmed. If a theory’s predictions in its characteristic regime
are indeed in agreement with all possible data, the theory shall be called
empirically viable. Non-empirical confirmation thus amounts to an increase
of trust in the theory’s empirical viability. Note that this understanding of
confirmation in a certain respect stays closer to an empiricist understanding
2The concept was first laid out in (Dawid 2006) and then further developed in (Dawid
2013). A Bayesian formalization of one argument of non-empirical confirmation was given
in (Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger 2015).
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than concepts of empirical confirmation that are based on truth probabil-
ity. By avoiding reference to truth, we block the possibility that theories
which have no empirical implications get non-empirically confirmed. Trust
in theories that have no empirical implications is trivial on our account and
cannot be increased by any means. Therefore, confirmation of non-predictive
theories cannot occur.
Second, we will require that confirmation be based on some observations
about the world beyond the theory and its endorser. The mere fact that a
consideration contributes to a person’s subjective belief in a theory’s viability
does not justify calling that consideration non-empirical confirmation on our
account. For example, the fact that some scientists trust elegant theories does
not imply that a theory’s elegance constitutes non-empirical confirmation.
Being based on observations about the world is a fairly vague requirement,
however. Which kind of relation between observation and confirmation do
we require? One might follow various strategies in this regard. One plausible
guideline, which we will follow, is a structural similarity between empirical
and non-empirical confirmation.
We will introduce the following fairly specific definition of non-empirical
confirmation. Non-empirical confirmation is based on observations about
the research context of the theory to be confirmed. Those observations lie
within the intended domain of a meta-level hypothesis about the research
process and, in an informal way, can be understood to provide empirical
confirmation of that meta-level hypothesis. The meta-level hypothesis, in
turn, is positively correlated with the probability of the truth or viability of
the scientific theory under scrutiny.
This may seem like a fairly complicated and arbitrary construction at first
glance. However, it has a number of considerable merits. Most significantly,
non-empirical confirmation of the suggested kind turns out to work as a
reconstruction of the most conspicuous lines of reasoning that do generate
trust in a scientific theory beyond the limits of empirical confirmation.
Second, non-empirical confirmation in the suggested sense can be under-
stood in terms of an extension of the basis of observational evidence for a
theory. The mechanisms of connecting observations to the overall conceptual
framework remain the same as in the case of empirical confirmation. Con-
firmation is still based on comparing predictions with observations, but that
comparison may play out at the meta-level of analysing the research process
within which the theory is embedded rather than at the ground level of the
theory’s subject matter.
Third, and directly related to point 2, non-empirical confirmation of
the described kind resembles empirical confirmation in being symmetric be-
tween confirmation and dis-confirmation. Observations at the meta-level may
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equally support and speak against a theory’s viability, depending on whether
or not they agree with the predictions of the meta-level hypothesis. The cor-
relation between observational input and confirmation/dis-confirmation thus
works along very similar lines as in empirical confirmation.
2.2 Towards a Formalized Model
Conformation today is mostly understood in Bayesian terms. In this light,
we will analyse the nature of non-empirical confirmation from a Bayesian
perspective. It will turn out that a probabilistic approach is particularly
suitable for characterizing the way non-empirical confirmation works.
In Bayesian terms, an increase of trust in a theory’s viability is expressed
as an increase of the subjective probability that the theory is viable. As
already discussed, our use of probabilities of viability constitutes a deviation
from canonical Bayesian epistemology , which is based on truth probabilities.
We introduce the proposition T that a theory H is empirically viable (con-
sistent with all empirical data) within a given context. Let us first consider
the case of empirical confirmation. We take H to be confirmed by empirical
data E iff P (T|E) > P (T), that is if the subjective probability of the viabil-
ity of H is increased by E. If E lies within the extended domain of H, one
can deduce a probability of E from H and a set of initial conditions specified
based on other observations. A high probability of E then justifies
P (E|T ) > P (E) (1)
which implies that E confirms H due to Bayes’ formula
P (T |E)
P (T )
=
P (E|T )
P (E)
(2)
Now our goal is to replace E by some observations FX that are not in
the intended domain of H. In other words, H in conjunction with knowl-
edge about initial conditions for the system described by H does not provide
any information on the probability of FX . Nevertheless FX should imply
P (T|FX) > P (T).
Further, we want this probability increase to be induced via a new hy-
pothesis Y that lives at the meta-level of theory assessment and is positively
correlated with both F and T. Moreover, FX should be in the intended do-
main of Y, that is, implications for FX can be extracted from hypothesis
Y.
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In principle, one might try to find a specific variable Y X for each type of
non-empirical observation FX . However, we shall pursue a different strategy
and specify one Y that will be tested by various forms of FX . This strategy
has two advantages. First, it turns out to work well with respect to the
three most conspicuous candidates for non-empirical theory confirmation to
be found in science. And second, it allows for a more coherent overall under-
standing of the way the arguments of non-empirical confirmation mutually
support each other.
So what would be a plausible candidate for Y? It is helpful to think
about this question by looking at the most straightforward candidate for an
argument of non-empirical theory confirmation: the no alternatives argument
(see Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger 2015). Let us, for the time being,
continue the analysis within the framework of this specific argument. Later,
we will return to a more general perspective.
3 The No Alternatives Argument
Let us assume that we make the following observation FA: scientists have
looked intensely and for a considerable time for alternatives to a known
theory H that can solve a given scientific problem but haven’t found any.
This observation may be taken by us as an indication that the theory they
have is probably viable.
Clearly, this kind of reasoning plays an important role in generating trust
in some empirically unconfirmed or insufficiently confirmed theories in sci-
ence. As mentioned above, a specific reconstruction of a phenomenon or
object in anthropology or other historic sciences gains credibility if the case
can be made that no other plausible reconstruction has been found. Most
high energy physicists believed in the existence of a Higgs particle even be-
fore its discovery in 2012 because no satisfactory explanation of the mass
spectrum of elementary particles that did not rely on some kind of Higgs
particle had been found.
We call this kind of reasoning the no alternatives argument (NAA)
(Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger 2015). In the following, we give a Bayesian
reconstruction of NAA. In the case of NAA, we can easily identify the most
natural candidate for Y: to the extent FA increases the probability of the
viability of H, it arguably does so by supporting the hypothesis that there
in fact are no or very few possible scientific alternatives to H. NAA thus
involves an inference from an observation FA on the alternatives discovered
to a statement Y on the actual number of possible alternatives. Y thus is a
statement on the limitations on the number of possible scientific theories on
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a subject. In order to to make sense of this, we need to specify the framework
more clearly. Let us assume a theory H that is built to account for empirical
data D. We now assume that there exists a specific but unknown number
i of possible scientific theories (i.e. theories that satisfy a set of scientifical-
ity constraints C) which are compatible with the existing data D and give
distinguishable predictions for the outcome of some relevant set E of future
experiments.
Here, D specifies the empirical status quo. Possible scientific theories on
the subject must be consistent with the relevant available data D. In the
most straightforward cases, H can be shown either to predict data D or at
any rate to be consistent with it. There are also more difficult cases (like e.g.
string theory) where consistency of H with data D has not been established
but is considered plausible. Obviously, a situation of the latter type generates
a comparably lower prior probability P (T ). Still non-empirical confirmation
can work on that basis as well.
C specifies what counts as a scientific theory. Only those theories that
meet the scientificality-conditions C count as possible theories. Scientificality-
conditions are themselves volatile to a given degree and may change in time.
Note, however, that our formal argument does not rely on a precise specifi-
cation of the scientificality-conditions. All we need is the assumption that
scientists apply a set of scientificality-conditions that contains a viable core
that can be satisfied by theories that are empirically viable with respect to
the future experiments E .
Having introduced a framework for scientific theory building, we still
need to specify a way of individuating theories. We need to decide up to
which point we still speak of one theory and when we start talking about
two different theories.
Generally speaking, we individuate theories by their predictive implica-
tions with respect to future experiments E . Theories which give the same
predictions (or the same range of predictions under variation of their parame-
ter values) count as one theory. The reason for choosing this approach is that
we are mainly interested in empirical predictions. Trust in a theory, from
our perspective, is justified if the theory ends up making correct predictions.
Since we only talk about empirical viability and not about truth, questions
related to the spectrum of empirically equivalent theories lie beyond the scope
of our analysis.
The specific form of criteria for theory individuation depends on the kind
of predictions one is interested in. Therefore, we don’t prescribe those criteria
in detail. Scientists implicitly select them in dependence on the level at which
they trust their theory’s predictions. Let us explicate this by looking at the
example of the empirical testing of the Higgs model. The Higgs model is a
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theoretical concept that can explain why elementary particles have masses.
It predicts the existence of a scalar particle with a mass that lies within a
certain range of possible values. Physicsts had a high degree of trust in the
existence of the Higgs particle already long before the particle’s discovery in
2012. Let us now assume that, before 2012, some physicist wanted to predict
that the Higgs-particle existed and had precisely mass M1. This ‘theory’, let
us call it H1, would have been distinct from any other exemplification of the
Higgs model that predicted a different mass for the Higgs particle. In order
to count the alternatives to H1 one would have had to count each of these
variations as an individual ‘theory’ Hn and thus would have got an infinite
number of possible alternatives to H1. Given that physics before 2012 did
not offer arguments for the precise Higgs mass, it would have been clear that
one could not trust H1 or its predictions. Individuating theories based on
specific Higgs masses thus would have been an inadequate basis for deploying
NAA with respect to the Higgs hypothesis.
Since there was no basis for predicting the precise Higgs mass before 2012,
physicists were most interested in the question as to whether the Higgs par-
ticle exists at all without specifying its precise mass. They were interested
in the general viability of the Higgs hypothesis as a theoretical mechanism
that could explain particle masses and implied the existence of at least one
scalar particle – and they were quite confident about the viability of the Higgs
mechanism even in the absence of empirical data. When analysing this situa-
tion, an assessment of possible alternatives to the Higgs hypothesis must not
count different mass values as different theories. Even the specification of the
Higgs model beyond its core structure (by introducing addditional scalars,
a constituent structure of the Higgs particle, etc.) would not have counted
as a different theory at this level. Only substantially different approaches to
mass generation which did not rely on a scalar field would have counted as
alternatives to the Higgs hypothesis. The fact that one had not found any
convincing alternatives at this level gave reason for having trust in the via-
bility of the Higgs hypothesis even in the absence of empirical confirmation.
The level of theory individuation used in NAA had to correspond to this line
of reasoning.
Having thus clarified the framework for specifying the number i of possible
alternatives to theory H, we can now proceed to the proof that NAA amounts
to confirmation of H in Bayesian terms based on a set of very plausible
assumptions.
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Figure 1: The Bayesian Network representation of the two-propositions sce-
nario.
4 Formalizing the No Alternatives Argument
We introduce the binary propositional variables T and FA, already encoun-
tered in the previous section.3 T takes the values
T The hypothesis H is empirically viable.
¬T The hypothesis H is not empirically viable.
and FA takes the values
FA The scientific community has not yet found an alternative to H that
fulfills C, explains D and predicts the outcomes of E .
¬FA The scientific community has found an alternative to H that fulfills C,
explains D and predicts the outcomes of E .
We would now like to explore under which conditions FA confirms H, that
is, when
P (T|FA) > P (T) . (3)
We then introduce variable Y that mediates the connection between T and
FA. In the previous section, we characterized Y in general terms as a state-
ment about limitations to the number of possible alternatives to theory H. In
our formalization, we are more specific. Y has values in the natural numbers,
and Yk corresponds to the proposition that there are exactly k hypotheses
that fulfil C, explain D and predict the outcomes of E .
The value of FA—that scientists find/do not find an alternative to H—
does not only depend on the number of available alternatives, but also on
the relation between the difficulty of the problem and the capabilities of the
scientists. Call the variable that captures this factor S, and let it take values
in the natural numbers, with Sj := {S = j} and dj := P (Sj). The higher the
values of S, the more difficult the problem is to solve for the scientists.4 It is
3The presentation of this section is largely taken from (Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger
2015)
4For the purpose of our argument, it is not necessary to assign a precise operational
meaning to the various levels of S. It is sufficient that they satisfy a natural monotonicity
assumption with regard to their impact on FA—see condition A3.
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Figure 2: The Bayesian Network representation of the four-propositions sce-
nario.
clear that S has no direct influence on Y and T (or vice versa), but that it
matters for FA and that this influence has to be represented in our Bayesian
Network.
We now list five plausible assumptions that we need for showing the
validity of the No Alternatives Argument.
A1. The variable T is conditionally independent of FA given Y :
T ⊥FA|Y (4)
Hence, learning that the scientific community has not yet found an
alternative to H does not alter our belief in the empirical adequacy of
H if we already know that there are exactly k viable alternatives to H.
A2. The variable D is (unconditionally) independent of Y :
D ⊥Y (5)
Recall that D represents the aggregate of those context-sensitive factors
that affect whether scientists find an alternative to H, but that are not
related to the number of suitable alternatives. In other words, D and
Y are orthogonal to each other by construction.
These are our most important assumptions, and we consider them to be
eminently sensible. Figure 2 shows the corresponding Bayesian Network. To
complete it, we have to specify the prior distribution over D and Y and the
conditional distributions over FA and T , given the values of their parents.
This is done in the following three assumptions.
A3. The conditional probabilities
fkj := P (FA|Yk,Dj) (6)
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are non-increasing in k for all j ∈ N and non-decreasing in j for all
k ∈ N.
The (weak) monotonicity in the first argument reflects the intuition
that for fixed difficulty of a problem, a higher number of alternatives
does not decrease the likelihood of finding an alternative to H. The
(weak) monotonicity in the second argument reflects the intuition that
increasing difficulty of a problem does not increase the likelihood of
finding an alternative to H, provided that the number of alternatives
to H is fixed.
A4. The conditional probabilities
tk := P (T|Yk) (7)
are non-increasing in k.
This assumption reflects the intuition that an increase in the number
of alternative theories does not make it more likely that scientists have
already identified an empirically adequate theory.
A5. There is at least one pair (i, k) with i < k for which (i) yi yk > 0 where
yk := P (Yk), (ii) fij > fkj for some j ∈ N, and (iii) ti > tk.
In particular, this assumption implies that yk < 1 for all k ∈ N because
otherwise, a pair satisfying (i) could not be found.
With these five assumptions, we can show that (For a proof, see Dawid,
Hartmann and Sprenger 2015):
Theorem 1. If Y takes values in the natural numbers N and assumptions
A1 to A5 hold, then FA confirms T, that is, P (T|FA) > P (T).
FA thus confirms the empirical viability of H under rather weak and
plausible assumptions.
5 The Meta-Inductive Argument
So NAA formally constitutes confirmation. The question remains, however,
how significant that confirmation is. The problem is that we have two possible
explanations of FA. FA may be explained by the fact that there are no or
very few possible alternatives to H. However, it might also be explained by a
statement of type S: scientists are not clever enough to find the complicated
alternatives that are possible. FA cannot distinguish between those two kinds
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of explanation. If it is our prior assessment that an explanation of type S is
far more likely to apply than an explanation of type Y, even the most powerful
observation FA could not alter this assessment. Therefore, if we start with
very low priors for low number Yks and high priors for the hypothesis that
scientists are not clever enough to find most of the alternatives, FA won’t
strongly increase probabilities for low number Yks and therefore won’t provide
significant confirmation of H.
In order to turn NAA into a significant argument, we therefore need a
second line of reasoning that allows us to distinguish between S and Y and,
on that basis, can establish considerable probabilities of low number Yks
which can then serve as a basis for significant confirmation of H by NAA.
This brings us to the second argument of non-empirical confirmation,
the meta-inductive argument (MIA). The meta inductive argument is based
on the observation FM that those theories in the research field that satisfy a
given set of conditions K (note that these are not the scientificality conditions
C but may be considerably more restrictive) have shown a tendency of being
viable in the past.
A meta-inductive step leads directly from FM to inferring a high prob-
ability P (T |FM). However, in order to use MIA as support for NAA, it is
helpful once again to use the statements Y as an intermediary. In order to
do so, we have to assume a stronger connection between empirical viability
and the number of alternatives. The simplest and most straightforward as-
sumption would be that the theory found by the scientists is a random pick
from the set of empirically distinguishable possible alternatives. This means
that a theory’s chances of being viable is P (T ) = 1/i. Based on this model
one can understand our subjective probability P (T ) in terms of our assess-
ment of the probabilities of numbers of alternatives. For the simple model
introduced above we get
P (T ) =
∑
k
P (Yk)P (T |Yk) =
∑
k
1
k
P (Yk). (8)
On that basis, if one observes a certain success rate of theories in a re-
search field that satisfy conditions K, a frequentist analysis enforces substan-
tial probabilities for Yks with low k. To give an example, let us assume that
we observe a success rate of 50% of theories that satisfy K. A simple calcula-
tion shows that, based on our model and frequentist data analysis, we must
attribute a probability of 1/3 or higher to the hypothesis (k = 1 ∨ k = 2).
MIA therefore generates assessments of P (Yk) which can then serve as priors
in NAA.
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MIA thus strengthens explanation Y of FA and weakens explanation S
correspondingly: if scientists have been so successful in finding viable theories
in the past, it seems less plausible to assert that they are not clever enough
for doing the same this time. Therefore, MIA can turn NAA into a method
of significant confirmation.
One important worry may arise even if MIA and NAA look strong: it is
not a priori clear whether the empirically unconfirmed theory that is eval-
uated is sufficiently similar in relevant respects to earlier successful theories
to justify meta-inductive inference from the viability of those earlier theories
to the viability of the present one.
Now it may happen that the theory under evaluation is so closely related
and the problems addressed are so similar to earlier cases that there just
seems no plausible basis for that worry. The Higgs hypothesis is an example
of such a scenario. It is so deeply immersed in standard model physics that
it would be quite implausible to argue that physicists understood the other
problems raised with respect to the standard model sufficiently well but were
not up to the complexity of the Higgs case.
In a similar vein, certain principles of reconstructing species from scarce
excavated evidence may be applicable in many fairly similar individual cases.
If such a strategy has proved successful in a number of cases, this may be
sufficient for trusting the reliability of the method in similar cases in the
future, provided the method offers the only known plausible reconstruction
of the given species.
In cases like those referred to above, NAA and MIA in conjunction can be
sufficient for generating a high degree of trust in a theory. The trust in the
Higgs mechanism was indeed generated largely by those two arguments: the
understanding that no convincing alternative to the Higgs mechanism was
forthcoming and the observation that standard model physics had turned out
predictively extremely successful whenever it had been tested.
6 Unexpected explanatory interconnections
There are other cases, however, where differences between previous theories
and the new one with respect to the nature or the complexity of the core
problems are very significant. String physics is a particularly good example
of such a situation. Though string theory stands in the tradition of previous
high energy physics, it clearly is a far more complex and difficult theory
than any of its forebears. Thus it may easily be argued that, while scientists
were clever enough to understand the spectrum of possibilities in the case of
standard model physics, they are not up to the task with respect to string
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physics.
In cases like this, a third argument is required in order to turn NAA+MIA
into a convincing line of reasoning. Arguably, the most effective argument of
this kind is the argument of unexpected explanatory interconnections (UEA).
The observation FU on which this argument is based is the following. Theory
H was developed in order to solve a specific problem. Once H was developed,
physicists found out that H also provides explanations with respect to a range
of problems which to solve was not the initial aim of developing the theory.
The argument is structurally comparable to the argument of novel em-
pirical confirmation: a theory that was developed in order to account for a
given set of empirical data correctly reproduces data that had not entered the
theory’s construction process. UEA is the non-empirical ”cousin” of novel
confirmation. Instead of successful novel empirical predictions, the theory
provides unexpected explanatory interconnections that do not translate into
successful empirical predictions.
The most prominent example of UEA in the context of string theory is the
microphysical derivation of the black hole entropy area law in special cases
of black holes. String theory was not developed for providing this derivation.
More than two decades after string theory was proposed as a theory of all
interactions, Vafa and Strominger (1996) succeeded in providing it.
UEA fits well into the category of non-empirical confirmation because it
can be read as an argument for limitations to underdetermination just like
NAA and MIA. The line of reasoning in the case of UEA is the following.
Let us assume a set of n seemingly unrelated scientific problems in a research
field. Let us further assume that there is a number i of possible alternative
solutions to one of those problems. If the number of possible solutions to
a specific problem is typically much higher than n, we have no reason to
expect that a random solution to one problem will solve other problems as
well. If we assume, however, that i is typically substantially smaller than n,
we may plausibly assume that consistent strategies for solving one individual
problem will typically be applicable to a number of problems. The reason
for this is that we know that there is one theory, the true theory, that does
solve all n problems. Therefore, in the extreme case that there is only one
consistent solution to the problem we look at, all problems must be solved by
that theory. Inversely, the observation that the theory that was developed
for solving the given problem turns out to answer a number of other open
questions as well can be taken as an indicator that there probably are very few
possible different solutions to the given problem. From that consideration,
once again, there follows a reasonably high probability that the given theory
is viable.
UEA is of particular importance in contemporary fundamental physics,
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where theory building gets extremely difficult and UEA can provide a check
as to whether or not physicists are capable of dealing with the overall set
of problems they face in a way that goes beyond limited puzzle solving with
respect to individual problems.
7 Conclusion
What is the status on non-empirical theory confirmation? As already em-
phasised in the introduction, non-empirical confirmation is an extension of
empirical confirmation with a widened arsenal of conceptual tools but sim-
ilar basic patterns of reasoning. It is secondary to empirical confirmation
for two reasons. First, non-empirical confirmation is understood as a tool
for establishing a theory’s viability. Viability however, as defined in Section
2, is based on the theory’s agreement with empirical data. Therefore, the
perspective of eventual empirical testing is always in the background and,
once conclusive empirical testing can be achieved, will in all cases make a
stronger case for the theory’s viability than non-empirical confirmation ever
could. Second, the significance of non-empirical confirmation crucially relies
on MIA. MIA, however, as described in Section 5, is based on empirical con-
firmation somewhere else in the research field. Non-empirical confirmation
therefore can only work properly as long as empirical confirmation can be
achieved somewhere in the research field.
Non-empirical confirmation is closely linked to a probabilistic view on
confirmation. To a philosopher who denies that confirmation has anything
to do with attributing a probability to a theory’s viability or truth, non-
empirical confirmation will look empty. On the other hand, to a philosopher
who acknowledges a probabilistic basis of confirmation, it seems difficult to
deny that non-empirical confirmation exists. From that perspective, the core
question becomes how significant non-empirical confirmation can be. This
paper offered some indications as to how a formal argument in favour of the
significance non-empirical confirmation could be developed.
It has to be emphasised that a general argument for the legitimacy of non-
empirical confirmation by no means implies that each individual deployment
of non-empirical confirmation is convincing. There are cases in science, some
of which have been mentioned in this paper, where the actual strength and
influence of non-empirical arguments for a theory’s viability is indeed striking.
There are many others where understanding the strengths and weaknesses of
the use of non-empirical confirmation requires careful analysis. I suggest that
a probabilistic account of non-empirical confirmation provides a promising
framework for carrying out that kind of analysis in a fruitful way.
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